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an Zwicky and Anne Carson are two of Canada’s best known 
and most influential poet-scholars of the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries. Both are university educators and lyric 
poets, and both have published texts that challenge the conventional 
distinctions separating classical scholarship, art criticism, philoso-
phy, and poetry. In Eros the Bittersweet (1986), for instance, Carson 
conducts a scholarly inquiry into the effects of the Greek alphabet on 
ancient conceptions of lyrical selves in love, freely and anachronistically 
supplementing her arguments with examples from such moderns as de 
Beauvoir, Freud, Kafka, and Woolf along the way. In the philosophical 
treatises Lyric Philosophy (1992) and Wisdom & Metaphor (2003), Zwicky 
speaks out against the skepticism of analytic philosophy by advocating 
for modes of inquiry that are not solely reliant upon logic and reason, 
but embrace such conventionally “artistic” paths to knowledge as emo-
tion, intuition, and physical sensation. Zwicky’s and Carson’s writings 
are powerfully suggestive of the ever-present need of intellectual com-
munities to reflect on the circumstances and decisions that distinguish 
academic faculties (and artistic genres) from one another; and, through 
Zwicky’s work in particular, the term lyric has come to signify a contem-
porary movement in which poets and scholars are resisting what seem 
to them to be prescriptive and unethical programs for academic pursuit.
This essay represents my strategic decision to interpret some of 
Carson’s scholarly and creative methods as examples of lyric, with lyric 
in this case carrying the political connotations that the term bears in 
Zwicky’s writing, and in the work of certain scholars and poets now 
following her example. The most obvious result of this decision is 
that Zwicky’s and Carson’s writing lives are brought into relation with 
each other within these pages: a juxtaposition that is still infrequent 
in Canadian literary criticism.1 Though the two poets are dissimilar 
thinkers in many respects, they have occupied similar positions on the 
academic and literary stages of Canada and the US, and their respective 
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approaches to scholarly and creative publishing suggest ample material 
for comparison. More pointedly, the application of the term lyric to 
Carson’s work enables a discussion of “lyric scholarship” within the 
frame of academic controversy: a topic that I consider to be particularly 
timely now that a revised second edition of Lyric Philosophy has appeared 
from Gaspereau Press (2012), even as academics and poets taking up 
the mantle of Zwicky’s lyric are making their voices heard more than 
ever before.2 
Revisiting the Montreal poet and critic David Solway’s infamous 
Books in Canada attack on Carson in 2001, this essay connects Solway’s 
preoccupation with Carson’s scholarly and pedagogic influence in North 
America to later complaints echoed by the poet and critic Zach Wells, 
in a severe critique of Zwicky published in Books in Canada in 2004. 
Solway’s essay, “The Trouble with Annie: David Solway Unmakes Anne 
Carson,” is informed in part by contemporary concerns — which were, 
at the time, being vocalized virulently by American education crit-
ics — about the politicization of North American universities, whose 
humanities departments were being reshaped from within by new work 
in feminist, postcolonial, race, and queer theories in the last decades of 
the twentieth century. Beyond criticizing Carson and her work, Solway’s 
essay reacts against academia’s growing awareness of the inadequacy of 
the scales that once measured brilliant poets against bad, and memor-
able intellects against the mediocre. “The Trouble with Annie” is as 
much a lament for a lost ideal of humanities teaching as it is a polemic 
against Carson herself, and it argues that Carson’s fame is the result 
of a failed educational system: one in which the distinctive, unique 
voice of the individual (and historically masculine) ego might no longer 
be glorified. Similarly, Wells’s criticism of Zwicky implicitly attributes 
her lyric approach — in this case translated into the context of liter-
ary reviewing — to a markedly feminine and naive intellectual stance. 
Solway and Wells write as though Carson’s and Zwicky’s respective 
approaches are the result of ignorance, miseducation, and cultural fash-
ion rather than deliberately strategic decisions, and they treat Zwicky’s 
and Carson’s scholarly “failings” as identifiably female flaws. As a new 
generation of creative academics attempts to set lyric thought to work 
in the university, it is worthwhile to consider how representations of 
gender have inflected its reception in the past. Though many among 
the “rising generation of lyric scholars” (Lahey 26) are activating lyric 
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in the interest of ecological awareness and ethical engagement with the 
non-human world, it is clear that lyric work brings the residually mascu-
linist attitudes of much academic and literary culture into focus as well.
Discussing Carson’s work through the lens of Zwicky’s lyric requires 
some qualification: Carson’s readers typically interpret the genre-bend-
ing qualities of her books and visual performances as signs of post-
modernist abandon, and a taste for the (Nietzschean) playfulness of 
incongruity and unlikely juxtaposition (see Campbell 9; Kirsch 39; 
Murray 103). Zwicky’s formal innovations, on the other hand, are 
unequivocally opposed to the spirit of postmodern play. Linguistically, 
Zwicky emphasizes responsibility to material reality; structurally, she 
emphasizes cohesion and resonant integrity; philosophically, her goal 
is to intervene against intellectual traditions (analytic philosophy and 
poststructuralism in particular) that do not seem to do justice to the 
material world — particularly to the current world brought to eco-
logical crisis by human desire for technological and rational mastery. In 
contrast, the postmodern qualities of Carson’s writing have sometimes 
seemed distinctly anti-lyrical to critics: in a review of Autobiography 
of Red: A Novel in Verse (1998), Adam Kirsch suggests that Carson’s 
incorporation of intertextual allusion and academic structures in that 
text is “at heart nonpoetic, even antipoetic,” and he argues that Carson 
“moves very far from the lyric, and begins to write something that is 
halfway between a prose poem and a puzzle” (“Mere Complexities” 37).3 
Traditionally, studies in poetics associate lyric voices with self-
expression, often representing the heightened, artistically attuned con-
sciousness of a powerful and singular mind at work. Zwicky’s sense of 
lyric suggests the opposite: her philosophy devalues the primacy of the 
ultra-vocal lyric ego, and advocates instead for the self-supplanting pose 
of the attentive listener. Lyric Philosophy and Wisdom & Metaphor are 
both composed of hundreds of diverse parts — aphorisms, fragments 
of poems, reproductions of paintings and advertisements, transcriptions 
of musical scores — and, as such, they run the risk of appearing to be 
strikingly incoherent. As with polyphonic compositions in music, no 
one voice in either Lyric Philosophy or Wisdom & Metaphor is meant 
to overpower any other; no one ego reigns supreme. Kirsch’s review of 
Autobiography of Red takes issue with the book’s unconventional struc-
ture because it seems to him that Carson’s allusions and framing devices 
“are not integral: they are showy, deliberately exterior to the main enter-
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prise” (40). In Zwicky’s philosophy, as in much of Carson’s work, the 
main enterprise is exteriority, and multiplicity: both poet-scholars dem-
onstrate that seemingly variant elements can ignite gestalt perceptions of 
wholes greater than the sums of their parts. In Zwicky’s thinking, lyric 
is enabled by “the resonant structure of the universe” (Lyric L70):4 all of 
her writings proceed from the thought that the world itself exists in a 
state of cohesion far more complex than any one poem, person, or voice 
could comprehend alone. For her, lyric compositions are reflections of 
“Unity that is dependent on multiplicity for its meaning, that depends 
on multiplicity in order to mean” (L67).
In Lyric Philosophy, Zwicky writes of lyric thought as “an attempt 
to comprehend the whole in a single gesture” (L73). In her philosophy, 
complete lyric experience transcends human language and artistry: it is 
that in which one’s phenomenological sense of self (the mode in which 
my ego is understood to be distinct from that which I perceive) is no 
longer the lens through which the world is seen. For Zwicky, human 
beings’ capacity for language use, and our attendant, characteristic per-
ception of ourselves as separate from our surroundings, is the cause of 
lyric desire — the impetus for lyric thought and composition (L132). 
Lyric desire is the eros to be one with external reality, to experience 
“fusion as the lifting of the screen of ‘self ’ that separates us from the 
world, fusion as the complete fulfilment of the intuition of coherence” 
(see L127, L133). To give in to such desire for fusion requires the aban-
donment of self: “To fuse the self with the world,” Zwicky writes, “is to 
forfeit the self” (L133). What Lyric Philosophy explores, therefore, are the 
ways in which thinkers and artists — lyric philosophers — might chan-
nel lyric’s “intuition” of coherence into investigations and compositions 
that are multi-dimensional, resonant, and concerned to know the world 
for reasons other than its potential use-value. Lyric philosophy and art 
(categories that need not be distinct from each other) are characteris-
tically “poignant, and musical,” and move “by association of images” 
(L73). They might “sew thought together along lines of musical coher-
ence as well as cut it according to semantic and syntactic demarcations” 
(L95), and they are “based in an integrity of response and co-response; 
each dimension attending to the others” (L181). “The mouth of lyric,” 
Zwicky writes, “is an ear” (L181).
Although Carson’s work does not share the same concern for eco-
logical and intellectual ethics that drives Zwicky’s, many of her writ-
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ings nevertheless enact lyric gestures. She frequently demonstrates that 
scholarly and emotional insight need not be distinct, and stages her 
own pedagogical strategies through the act of “setting things side by 
side” — as Zwicky puts it in Wisdom & Metaphor — “until the similar-
ity dawns” (L7). Comparatively speaking, Carson’s Eros the Bittersweet 
is different from Zwicky’s Lyric Philosophy in scope, but not in spirit: 
both books are the honed, poetically mature versions of their respective 
authors’ doctoral dissertations, and each stretches the genre of academic 
analysis through formal innovation and emphases on correspondence 
through juxtaposition. Lyric Philosophy is the structural transformation 
of Zwicky’s thesis A Theory of Ineffability (1981), with which she com-
pleted her PhD in philosophy; Eros the Bittersweet substantially revises, 
and renders slightly more oracular and aphoristic, Carson’s classics dis-
sertation, Odi et Amo Ergo Sum (1981). It is no more than coincidence, 
but salient coincidence nonetheless, that the two scholars defended their 
respective theses little more than a month apart from each other at the 
University of Toronto, in the autumn of 1981. Eros the Bittersweet begins 
with a story from Kafka (“The Top”); it takes its chapter epigraphs from 
writers as diverse as Auden, Barthes, Basho, Blake, Donne, Keats, Rilke, 
Stendahl, and Queen Victoria; and, throughout its scholarly investiga-
tions, it turns for illustrations to modern novelists and philosophers such 
as de Beauvoir, Flaubert, Kierkegaard, Lacan, Montaigne, Nietzsche, 
Sartre, and Woolf. It is, in other words, a rather strange classical studies 
text: at once an inquisition into ancient Greek conceptions of triangu-
lated eros, a study of the novel in ancient Greece, an argument that 
“Oral cultures and literature cultures do not think, perceive, or fall in 
love in the same way” (42), and, like the Kafka tale that inspires the 
study’s preface, a lyrically personal inquiry into “the reason why we love 
to fall in love” (xi).
Carson’s deepest intuition in Eros the Bittersweet is essentially 
Freudian: her theory of metaphor subtly echoes the economic theory 
of eros and thanatos that Freud developed during the First World War 
and published in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920). Celebrating tri-
angulation, tension, and the mediation (rather than culmination) of 
desire in love, literature, and metaphor, in Eros the Bittersweet the space 
beyond metaphoric tension is also, analogically, “the end of the novel”: 
what Freud describes as the body’s return to an earlier state without ten-
sion — death. “The unplucked apple, the beloved just out of touch, the 
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meaning not quite attained, are desirable objects of knowledge,” writes 
Carson: “It is the enterprise of eros to keep them so. The unknown must 
remain unknown or the novel ends” (109). Notably, Lyric Philosophy 
proceeds from a similar understanding: for Zwicky, lyric desires inte-
gration “whose fulfilment is impossible: the archer who strains to make 
the ends of the bow touch — even though this can happen only if the 
bow breaks” (L134). Negotiating this tension, in Zwicky’s work, is her 
concept of domesticity, which “embodies relief from the tension of lyric 
desire” by accepting “the essential tension between lyric desire and the 
capacity for technology” (L134-L138) — by accepting, in other words, 
human beings’ characteristic use of language, which marks our separa-
tion from, and the unknowability of, the non-human world. Eros the 
Bittersweet and Lyric Philosophy both recognize the dissolution of the 
self as the outcome of lyrical culmination. For Carson, this finality 
is tinged with dissatisfaction: when desire is fulfilled, the story ends. 
Zwicky’s writings are more ambivalent: the forfeiture of one’s phenom-
enological sense of self may well result in blissful, egoless integration 
into an oceanic whole.
In its issue of January 2012, the academic magazine University 
Affairs remarks upon the growth of “lyric scholarship, a young hybrid 
field” (Berkowitz 3). In a feature article entitled “Academic papers get 
poetic,” the poet and journalist Anita Lahey affirms that lyric scholar-
ship is “quietly f lourishing in Canada,” and states further that Lyric 
Philosophy is “a bible of sorts for the rising generation of lyric scholars” 
(26). Lahey’s article reports on two sessions that ran during the aca-
demic Congress of the Social Sciences and Humanities in Fredericton, 
New Brunswick, in the spring of 2011: a joint session between the 
Association of Canadian College and University Teachers of English 
and the Canadian Philosophical Association, on “Jan Zwicky and Lyric 
Philosophy,” and a corresponding poetry event where the conventional 
hierarchy of academic scholarship was inverted with readings of poems 
on scholarly themes, rather than presentations of scholarly papers on 
poems. Recording conversations with a number of the poetry event’s 
attendees, Lahey’s article assembles a variety of descriptions of lyric 
work. Lahey introduces it in opposition to traditional scholarship: “We 
tend to think of a ‘lyric’ as a musical and intensely emotional written 
work,” she writes; “Scholarship, on the other hand, is seen at its ideal 
as cool, objective analysis” (26). Clare Goulet is quoted as saying that 
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“Academic scholarship has, by and large, for the last 100 years or so 
allowed one form of knowing to be the only way . . . . But the lyric 
approach, as opposed to dissecting, taking apart for the purposes of 
examination, is about keeping something whole and alive in its context” 
(26). Further, Rob Winger suggests “that the lyric approach is far from 
new: its worth was proven by influential Canadian poets and thinkers 
such as Robert Kroetsch and Daphne Marlatt as far back as the 1970s” 
(27).
There is much to be noted here: the distinctly ecological resonance 
of Goulet’s suggestion that lyric keeps a thing “whole and alive in its 
context”; the implied opposition between that ecological imperative and 
(less ethical?) processes of academic “dissection,” which suggest decon-
struction; the allusions to a critical and scholarly history that has not 
been welcoming of emotionally inspired work. These themes point in 
more directions than a short essay can hope to pursue, and so the brevity 
of Lahey’s article leaves much to be mulled over. There are, however, a 
number of generalizations that could be clearer: for instance, the “one 
form of knowing” to which Goulet refers does not adequately account 
for the diversity of revolutions and politicizations that have shaped aca-
demic studies, in the humanities and elsewhere, in the past century. 
Even taking into account Michel Foucault’s stark depiction of the uni-
versity as an “institutional apparatus through which society ensures its 
own uneventful reproduction, at least cost to itself” (224) — an estima-
tion that Carson echoed in a speech delivered at McGill University in 
1998 (“The Idea” 7) — it will not do to gloss over its complex histories. 
As Heather Murray has argued (with departments of English specific-
ally in mind), “in order to reform and understand the discipline . . . it 
is first necessary to shift the focus of examination down and back” (3).
There was a time, Murray writes, when Canadian universities were, 
“in the public eye and their own, more closely attuned to the public 
system of education overall, with university professors characteristically 
producing public lectures, programs for humanities studies, and even 
lower-school curricula and texts” (74). In Canadian English depart-
ments, these public relations were enforced in part by the historically 
“high proportions of creative writers among departmental staff ” — a 
proportion that was, Murray argues, “an important component of the 
progressive politics of the discipline” (80-81). Of course, not all com-
binations of creative inclinations and academic situations result in lyric 
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scholarship, as Canada’s numerous and widely incongruous traditions 
of academic-creative writers attest. Indeed, Winger’s suggestion, in the 
University Affairs article, that Kroetsch and Marlatt are precursors to 
lyric scholarship is more contentious than the article lets on: while the 
case might be made for the lyric quality of some of Marlatt’s work (in 
Lyric Philosophy, Zwicky transcribes a portion from Marlatt’s Touch to 
My Tongue [1984] [R81]), Kroetsch’s characteristic cocktail of documen-
tary poetry, Bakhtinian novelization theory, Derridean and Yale School 
deconstruction, Foucauldian archaeological discourse, and Heideggerian 
phenomenological ontology is in many ways antagonistic to Zwicky’s 
conceptualizations of lyric. Zwicky takes great pains in Lyric Philosophy 
and elsewhere to challenge the philosophical assumptions that inform 
Kroetsch’s postmodernist work, and her writings are resolutely opposed 
to the theoretical vocabulary that Kroetsch delights in. Consider, for 
instance, an essay such as “For Play and Entrance: The Contemporary 
Canadian Long Poem,” where Kroetsch writes of unity “under erasure” 
(118), and of the sexualized “perpetual delay” of discovery (119), and 
where he suggests, furthermore, that “our interest is in, not story, but 
the act of telling the story” (120) — that is, in linguistic and textual 
process rather than content. In the essay “Once Upon a Time in the 
West: Heidegger and the Poets,” Zwicky addresses some of her problems 
with Heidegger’s and Derrida’s thinking, in a voice that could be that 
of a cattle rancher or prairie wheat king: “it’s not that there’s Things, 
Out There, an ya gotta take care of ’em unh-uh; it’s that human lan-
guage equals Thought equals the Whole Sheebang” (Thinking 192). “I 
know there’s no way I can prove with some argument that that’s not 
the way it is,” the voice continues, “an yeah, I even know that if I try, 
whatever argument I come up with’s gonna Always Already be set on 
self-deconstruct. But that seems to me to be a problem with arguments, 
not a problem with the world” (195). While there might be great value 
in reviewing Kroetsch’s writings in the effort to seek out lyric qualities, 
aligning his work too quickly with Zwicky’s subverts the very purpose 
of Zwicky’s philosophical project.
In a subsequent issue of University Affairs (February 2012), the schol-
ar Cheryl Bartlett writes of having read Lahey’s article “with delight,” 
and goes on to note how a colleague’s research has been crafted with 
“lyric inquiry” (n. pag.) — another small example of the discursive 
currency that Zwicky’s lyric is beginning to attain. The nature of lin-
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guistic exchange is such that meaning disperses as a single word pro-
liferates among an expanding group of speakers; while this dispersal 
may attach a f lorescence of new meanings to the word, it may also 
obscure its original sense. In Zwicky’s use, lyric refers to instinctual, 
ontic desire, as well as to a range of intentional methods of thought and 
composition; and, though strategic adaptations of lyric will no doubt 
continue to enable positive conceptualizations of alternative academic 
work, the word will become a catch-all if the “rising generation” neg-
lects the critical and institutional histories from which it came. In Forge 
(2011), Zwicky’s latest collection of poems (which received a nomination 
for the Griffin Poetry Prize in 2012), a short suite entitled “Practising 
Bach” exemplifies lyric’s economic nature. The second poem in the 
suite, a prose piece called “Loure,” asks: “Why is Bach’s music more like 
speech than any other? Because of its wisdom, I think. Which means 
its tempering of lyric passion by domesticity, its grounding of the flash 
of lyric insight in domestic earth, the turf of dailiness” (26). “Loure” 
represents a unique moment in the tempo of these poems: each is named 
for a dance, and this one moves slowly. Its prosaic form sacrifices the 
reading speed offered by shorter lines while attempting to retain musi-
cality through vocalic echo: wisdom results from the “tempering of 
lyric passion”; the audible quality of “passion” echoes in the “flash” of 
insight; “domestic earth” and “turf of dailiness” form a harmonic pair. 
This internal resonance, however, does little to explain the poem’s terms: 
the referential significance of words like lyric and domesticity depends 
either on the reader’s familiarity with Zwicky’s characteristic use of 
those terms, or on one’s willingness to seek their meaning elsewhere 
in her writings. The poem points to a wide material and intertextual 
context that exists beyond it, and, as such, fails according to artistic 
standards (such as Kirsch’s) that prioritize self-containment and obvious 
unity. The poem is but one point on a path that must be followed back 
to Zwicky’s philosophical work in order for its own meaning to be real-
ized, and, as such, it acts as a signpost, not a destination.5
In Wisdom & Metaphor, Zwicky describes metaphor as the expres-
sion of “a homology, an isomorphism, between the way two things ges-
ture” (L9). While she and Carson have attracted appreciative audiences 
by cultivating homological resonances in their work, less sympathetic 
readers have been unwilling to accept the terms of such connections, 
interpreting deliberate choices made on the basis of outward direction 
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and metaphoric juxtaposition as signs of scholarly weakness: as mis-
understandings, mistranslations, or misleading errors and omissions. For 
instance, one early review of Lyric Philosophy commends Zwicky’s desire 
to challenge philosophy’s analytic tradition, but suggests that the book 
neglects to consider a number of intellectual traditions that might have 
made the job easier: “To create lyric philosophy,” writes Donald Phillip 
Verene, “she must rely for everything on Wittgenstein, the standard 
canon of moderns, and her own introspection” (128). Verene’s review 
overlooks the recuperative project of Lyric Philosophy, which highlights 
the artistry, unconventionality, ambivalence, and mystery of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s thinking: as with Zwicky’s poetry collection Wittgenstein 
Elegies (1988), Lyric Philosophy attempts to remove Wittgenstein from 
the ranks of analytic philosophers, poststructuralist theorists, and post-
modernist poets who have, in Zwicky’s view, misunderstood him (see 
Furlani). Zwicky’s writings frequently work to defamiliarize historical 
heavyweights, and this has been one of Carson’s recurring achievements 
as well, most notably in Economy of the Unlost (Reading Simonides of 
Keos with Paul Celan) (1999). Bringing an ancient Greek lyricist and 
a German-language poet — a survivor of the Holocaust, moreover — 
together in conversation is a move intended, in Carson’s words, to let 
them “keep each other from settling” (viii), a choice that foregrounds 
the importance of both defamiliarization and lyric attunement to iso-
morphism. Significantly, Solway’s “The Trouble with Annie” accuses 
Carson of misrepresenting her reliance, in Economy of the Unlost, on 
another scholar’s work, but his charge was dismissed by some of those 
who subsequently came to her defence: Ian Rae, for instance, argued 
that it did not “diminish the originality of Carson’s larger project, which 
is to draw connections” (“Hoaxes” 46).
Circulating throughout critical receptions such as these are questions 
regarding the nature of the writer’s responsibility to the reader — par-
ticularly when that writer is known to be a scholar and an educator as 
well as a poet — and of the reader’s responsibility to the text: his or her 
willingness to accept that understanding may require the translation of 
an idiosyncratic vocabulary, or the recognition of metaphorical, rather 
than strictly logical, correspondence. Such questions are informing cur-
rent critical discussions of lyric philosophy and scholarship, and they 
are also at stake in the controversies that touched Zwicky’s and Carson’s 
careers roughly a decade ago. In 2001, Solway drew upon his status as 
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an established literary critic, college educator, and associate editor of the 
now-defunct review magazine Books in Canada to publish a polemical 
attack on Carson’s scholarly and literary status; three years later, soon 
after Solway republished “The Trouble with Annie” in his essay collec-
tion Director’s Cut (2003), Wells published a polemical attack on Zwicky 
in Books in Canada, echoing a number of Solway’s characteristic com-
plaints. Both attacks dwelt implicitly on issues of poetic and pedagogic 
inf luence, and marked Zwicky’s and Carson’s relations to university 
teaching as contentious aspects of their writing lives.
Solway’s condescending use of the diminutive “Annie” in “The Trouble 
with Annie: David Solway Unmakes Anne Carson” not only infant-
ilizes Carson, but also invokes Alfred Hitchcock’s 1955 comedy The 
Trouble with Harry. In the film, Harry’s corpse is concealed, revealed, 
and re-hidden by the people who suspect themselves to be responsible 
for his death, and Hitchcock’s depiction of this morbidly circulating 
currency is the prevailing metaphor in Solway’s attack on Carson, which 
represents her as a monstrous golem made manifest by her readership, 
“moribund despite her apparent mobility” (26). In both the Books in 
Canada essay and the version that appears in Director’s Cut, Solway 
accuses Carson of intellectual appropriation, though he never utters 
the word plagiarism, but instead “invents,” as Rae notes, “a wealth of 
equivalent terms” (“Hoaxes” 49). “Looking closely at Carson’s practice,” 
Solway writes in Books in Canada, “it remains a moot question which is 
more precarious, the scholarship or the poetry which it often vitiates” 
(24). Though this version of the essay provoked defensive responses 
from scholars (Jennings, Rae), Solway’s condemnation of Carson as 
a researcher and teacher was contested less exhaustively than were his 
allegations concerning her poetic talent. 
The Director’s Cut version of “The Trouble with Annie” asks, “if the 
work is so obstreperously bad, how account for the reputation?” It then 
answers this question itself:
This is mainly spread and consolidated by editors, critics and 
reviewers, whose bookish expertise — regardless of whatever pre-
vious accomplishments they may licitly boast — can be described 
in far too many instances as a kind of higher Sesame Street word-
and-number recognition faculty. They tend to sound like sciolistic 
Counts and half-educated Big Birds, reacting with manic delight 
Jan Zwicky and Anne Carson 203
to the lexical doits and clippings and allusions that Carson-type 
poetry provides for their enlightenment. (44)
This passage, the tone of which is characteristic of the essay on the 
whole, is remarkable for its condemnation of Carson’s readership more 
so than Carson herself: the problem, as Solway sees it, is not simply that 
an audience with undiscerning ears is too easily satisfied by obstreperous 
verse, but that it delights in being educated by it, and embraces its use 
of outdated and foreign intellectual currency — the passage’s “lexical 
doits.” Significantly, the ancient Greeks consummated their notions of 
foreignness, adversarial relations, and the inability to speak Greek in 
one word, barbaros: root word of the English barbarian. If Carson is a 
barbarian instructor, as Solway’s depictions of her noisy, foreign lexi-
con of scholarship and poetry seem to imply, then those who choose to 
study under her must by the same logic be self-defeating listeners. In the 
Books in Canada version of the essay, Solway deprecatingly remarks that 
“Readers will tend to question their own intelligence rather than the 
poet’s competence when confronted by the capricious or the nebulous” 
(24), and suggests that Carson “may be the recipient of the benefits of 
an upward displacement assigned by critics who cannot surrender the 
hermeneutical cachet which [she] confers” (25). Grimly, he writes: “We 
have become dabblers in poetry and classical scholarship without having 
to know much about either” (26). 
In the Director’s Cut version of “The Trouble with Annie,” Solway 
makes a significant addition to the reproofs with which he challen-
ges Carson’s academic status. He writes that the American education 
critic Roger Kimball, the author of Tenured Radicals: How Politics Has 
Corrupted Our Higher Education (1990), has also “taken Carson to task 
for intellectual appropriation and poor scholarship, or in his own words, 
for ‘sycophantizing Aristotle’s Poetics’ and producing a piece of literary 
theorizing à la mode that begins with an egregious mistranslation of 
Aristotle and never really recovers” (42). Solway is here referring to a 
review by Kimball published in the TLS in March 1991, surveying the 
latest series of the classics journal Arion. Kimball’s review is indeed dis-
approving of Carson’s contribution to the journal, but it is not exactly 
as Solway depicts it: for one thing, Kimball’s use of the phrase “syco-
phantizing Aristotle’s Poetics” is not, in fact, “in his own words,” nor is 
it a deprecation of Carson at all: the phrase simply records the title of 
Carson’s essay “‘Just for the Thrill’: Sycophantizing Aristotle’s Poetics,” 
204 Scl/Élc
which is included in the issue of Arion under review. For another, 
Kimball at no point seems to accuse Carson of intellectual appropria-
tion, as Solway says he does. Why then does Solway make this claim?
The answer lies in part in the critical personality that Kimball cul-
tivated for himself in the 1990s, and in the issues of the TLS that were 
published in the months immediately preceding the statements that 
Solway paraphrases liberally in “The Trouble with Annie.” In a January 
1991 issue of the TLS, Tenured Radicals is reviewed unfavourably by 
Peter Brooks, who writes that in Kimball’s work — and in the writings 
of likeminded contemporaries such as Allan Bloom, Lynne V. Cheney, 
and William Bennett — “The polemic [against contemporary human-
ities departments in the US] has been pursued with more ressentiment 
than reason” (6). Brooks takes issue with Kimball’s alignment of intel-
lectual and political radicalisms (5), and notes the “blatant contradic-
tion” between, “on the one hand, the allegation that the new forms of 
humanistic study have alienated students, purported to have deserted 
humanities courses in droves, and on the other hand the assertion that 
the radicals have laid hold of the minds of the vast majority of the 
young, and are indoctrinating them in their perverse ideologies” (6). 
Despite obvious disagreement with many of Kimball’s views, Brooks 
also concedes to a number of his points: he writes, for instance, of his 
shared distaste for some of the uses to which “theory” has been put, and 
regrets that “the new ideas have sometimes flourished in a kind of intel-
lectual vacuum, without a sufficient sense of their origins and contexts” 
(6). The polemical nature of Kimball’s writing is, ultimately, Brooks’s 
sticking point: though he concurs that “There are pressing intellectual 
issues to be debated in American universities,” he maintains that books 
such as Tenured Radicals “give us precious little guidance to them” (6). 
“Reason, dialogue,” and “good will” are among the qualities that Brooks 
believes are necessary for “the working-out of some usable answers” (6).6
Kimball responded to Brooks’s review of Tenured Radicals with a 
letter to the editor published in the subsequent issue of the TLS:
The often nihilistic fatuousness of much that goes on in the 
name of scholarship and teaching in the American university 
today has, I believe, been amply documented. Doctoral disserta-
tions and books investigating the rock videos of Madonna; papers 
at the Modern Language Association devoted to “Jane Austen 
and the Masturbating Girl”, “The Lesbian Phallus: Or, Does 
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Heterosexuality Exist?”, “Counterhegemonic Discourse in The 
Comedy of Errors and The Winter’s Tale” . . . all this along with 
the sundry barbarisms that have congregated under the name of 
“theory” are now well known to be business as usual in higher 
education. (14)
The offending project titles listed here would have been familiar to 
any TLS readers who had already acquainted themselves with Tenured 
Radicals, throughout which Kimball’s frustration with the American 
academy’s apparent takeover by feminists is repeatedly demonstrated 
by his use of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s paper “Jane Austen and the 
Masturbating Girl” as an exemplar of “the destruction of the values, 
methods, and goals of traditional humanistic study” (xi; 145-46; 192; 
201). The tenured radicals of Kimball’s book and letter are those schol-
ars “who have conducted a devastating assault on the liberal arts cur-
riculum across the country, deliberately degrading and politicizing the 
humanities in the name of feminism, ethnic studies and multicultural-
ism; and it is they who have begun to campaign against free speech and 
pluralism for the sake of enforcing a narrow vision of political correct-
ness” (“Letter” 14). Kimball’s review of Arion appeared just one month 
after his letter to the editor was published, and his arguments therein 
that the journal “must set itself against the intellectual and political 
pieties currently regnant in the academy” in order to be “independent of 
intellectual fashion” provide the best contextualization of his opinion of 
Carson. Not intellectual appropriation in the sense of plagiarism, then, 
but rather intellectual appropriation in the sense of flagrantly running 
in the herd, is what is at stake in Carson’s work so far as Kimball is 
concerned.
One of Solway’s most oft-repeated complaints in the years surround-
ing his attack on Carson was that popular poetics in Canada seemed to 
him to have been “done by consortium”: they seemed to be the product 
of a “homogenizing” and “smearing out” of “the diction of the pre-
sumably singular poet into dreary equivalence” (“Standard” 19). This 
frustration found another spokesperson in Wells, who in his Books in 
Canada attack on Zwicky wrote of his fear of falling “prey to the merci-
less philistine forces of the agora” (41), and complained of Zwicky’s 
critical “impulse towards homogeneity, towards orthodoxy, towards the 
erasure of personality” (41). Wells’s essay, “Strawman Dialectics,” was 
published in Books in Canada while Solway was still an associate editor 
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of the magazine; primarily, it responds to an essay by Zwicky entitled 
“The Ethics of the Negative Review,” which had been published in 
the Malahat Review earlier that year. In “The Ethics of the Negative 
Review,” Zwicky suggests that when readers are confronted with “books 
we think are bad,” “in public, we keep our mouths shut” (59-60). Wells’s 
critique argues that Zwicky’s essay establishes a hypothetical negative 
reviewer as a straw man to be admonished and taken down; and, it 
suggests that this reviewer could be read as “a caricature, a composite 
perhaps of the more vitriolic sides of Solway, Sarah, Starnino, Henighan, 
Metcalf, Marchand, et al.” (40). Whether or not Zwicky had any or 
all of these critics in minds is impossible to tell from her essay, but 
both “The Ethics of the Negative Review” and “Strawman Dialectics” 
emerged in a literary atmosphere in which the fallout of “The Trouble 
with Annie” still lingered.7
“The Ethics of the Negative Review” implies more about Zwicky’s 
characteristic interest in phenomenological ethics than it does about 
the composite figure that Wells perceived to be its target. In it, Zwicky 
instructs reviewers to “let the ego go” (62), a recommendation that 
echoes her efforts in A Theory of Ineffability and Lyric Philosophy to 
demonstrate that “the human ego does not comprise the totality of 
what is real” (Lyric L92). Without conflating two distinct senses of the 
word ego — one the correlative of individualistic hubris, the other the 
psychoanalytic understanding of the self — it is helpful to think of 
Zwicky’s philosophical position, particularly its ecological relevance, as 
the source of her position on the ethics of literary response. If to review 
is, as she says, to “take a second look; or a third,” or to take “the trouble 
to listen again, to listen with care, curiosity, and respect” (“The Ethics” 
61), then the product of that looking and listening will be akin to the 
philosophical attention she encourages when she writes elsewhere of 
human interactions with non-human objects and species. Though she 
writes of having requested, during her tenure as the reviews editor of 
The Fiddlehead in the 1990s, that reviewers only choose to review books 
about which they are “genuinely enthusiastic” (54), “The Ethics of the 
Negative Review” is not a mandate for editorial censorship. Zwicky does 
not suggest that critics should be denied the space in which to write and 
publish negative reviews; rather, she wishes that they choose not to, of 
their own free will — particularly if they have been labouring under the 
misapprehension that either the canon or some ideal “standard of excel-
Jan Zwicky and Anne Carson 207
lence” requires “a cohort of hit-persons in each generation to maintain 
its authority” (56). Although A Theory of Ineffability, Lyric Philosophy, 
and Wisdom & Metaphor all demonstrate Zwicky’s preoccupation with 
that which cannot be said, rather than that which should not be publicly 
spoken or printed, reading “The Ethics of the Negative Review” in cor-
respondence with her more strictly philosophical work highlights the 
deliberation with which Zwicky asks reviewers to be open enough to 
perceive “not an award culture’s hierarchy of achievement,” but instead 
“a living chorus of voices, talking, murmuring, singing to themselves 
and to others” (61). 
“The Ethics of the Negative Review” sketches a “portrait” of the 
ideal reviewer, someone who is “a kind of literary naturalist, someone 
with sharp ears and a good memory, who’s willing to tarry alongside 
both us and the literary world” (61). This portrait recalls that of the 
birder in Don McKay’s gently self-parodying poem “Field Marks,” in 
which the birder “Wears extra eyes around his neck,” and his “mind / 
pokes out his ears the way an Irish Setter’s nose / pokes out a station-
wagon window” (Birding 15). Zwicky’s and McKay’s writings sug-
gest similar programs for ethical engagement with the world: whereas 
Zwicky speaks of “ontological attention” (Wisdom L52) and the deliber-
ate perception of “connection rather than isolation” (Lyric L69), McKay 
speaks of “poetic attention,” by which he means “a sort of readiness, 
a species of longing which is without the desire to possess” (Vis 26). 
These forms of attention resemble earlier pairings of phenomenological 
philosophy and literary criticism, such as those practiced in the mid-
twentieth century by men such as Gaston Bachelard, George Poulet, 
and Charles Olson, and, through them, by Canadian critics such as Eli 
Mandel, Frank Davey, and others of “the Tish generation” (Godard, 
“Structuralism/Post-Structuralism” 29). The literary implications of 
Zwicky’s philosophical position are part of this nebulous tradition, 
ref lecting phenomenological modes of reading and response, as well 
as what Barbara Godard has called the “underlying theory of com-
munication” that made Olson’s model of proprioception so attractive 
to west coast poetics in Canada and the US (“Critical Fictions” 254). 
They stand in relation to that tradition, however, in much the same way 
that Jung stands in relation to Freud in the history of psychoanalysis: 
throughout her writings, Zwicky consistently emphasizes her disagree-
ment with phenomenology’s characteristic prioritization of the perceiv-
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ing ego, and, as much as possible, attempts to foreground the material 
importance of the thing perceived rather than the identity of he or she 
who perceives it. 
These matters inform the subtext of “The Ethics of the Negative 
Review,” and their influence makes Wells’s antagonistic approach all 
the more noteworthy. Rather than addressing the deeper philosophical 
stakes of Zwicky’s essay, “Strawman Dialectics” conflates insinuations 
regarding Zwicky’s gender with jabs at her intellectual legitimacy. Wells 
twice refers to her as “Dr. Zwicky” (given his essay’s overall tone, the 
formality of the title suggests jest rather than respect), twice calls her 
“the good doctor,” and at one point describes her as “our fair professor,” 
running the moral connotations of the word fair into the word’s aes-
thetic, and typically feminized, meaning (41-42). Arguing that Zwicky’s 
position in “The Ethics of the Negative Review” is “fundamentally 
anti-intellectual,” Wells remarks that this is “an odd position for a phil-
osopher to put herself in,” and comments further that it is “based on the 
fuzzy-wuzzy realm of feelings and emotions” (41). Zwicky is represented 
as being amateurish: Wells writes that she has “an insufficient critical 
consciousness of the agenda she advances” (41), and, moreover, he brings 
the significance of women’s bodies and voices strangely into focus when 
he comments that Zwicky’s loaded use of the word “negative” “brings 
to mind another trenchant political analogy, the abortion debate” (40). 
Within the context of “Strawman Dialectics,” this analogy comes out of 
left field: it may be intended to call to mind questions concerning repro-
ductive rights (an analogy in which the silencing of negative reviews 
would be linked associatively with abortion), but, more than anything, 
it conjures a politically charged image of the female body itself. Even 
more strangely, within the broader discursive context of Zwicky’s writ-
ings, the analogy repeats, nearly verbatim, an argument that Zwicky 
herself anticipated in Lyric Philosophy more than a decade earlier.
Lyric Philosophy makes rhetorical use of a doubting interlocutor: a 
voice that crops up now and again to raise objections to the propositions 
that Zwicky puts forth. Early in the text, this voice asks, “Isn’t this just 
another version of anti-intellectualism? Aren’t you really just looking 
for emotion instead of thought?” (L86). “Zwicky” responds by asking 
in turn,
What sort of examples do we have in mind when we say things 
like, ‘emotion draws thought off course, muddies it’? The Duino 
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Elegies? The Apollo from the west pediment of the temple of Zeus 
at Olympia? Beethoven’s String Quartet Op. 95? More like debates 
over the legalization of abortion where, it seems, we can lose sight 
of certain issues in an excess of emotion — where our emotional 
investment in the realization of a particular outcome blinds us to 
thoughts (and feelings) that would tend to make that outcome less 
obviously desirable. (L88)
As “Strawman Dialectics” provides no indication of whether or not 
Wells had read Lyric Philosophy before composing his critique, the 
remarkable similarity between his arguments and those that Zwicky 
imagines in her own text casts suspicion over the integrity of Wells’s 
essay. Irony may be at work here, but, even if so, it cannot discount 
Wells’s troubling gendering of intellectual rigour in “Strawman 
Dialectics,” particularly when his allusions to women’s reproductive 
rights, and to stereotypically feminized minds, stand out all the more 
starkly without the added intertextual context of Lyric Philosophy. This 
stereoscopic targeting of, on the one hand, sex and gender, and, on 
the other, intellectual ability, is present throughout Solway’s attack on 
Carson as well, and Wells repeats it elsewhere: in a Books in Canada 
review of the poet (and now professor) Triny Finlay’s debut poetry col-
lection Splitting Off (2004), Wells takes issue with Finlay’s “treatment 
of feminist themes,” and criticizes the book as “an example of a growing 
trend: a first book by a poet either slightly younger or slightly older than 
thirty who has received her formation almost exclusively within uni-
versities” (31-32). As with Solway’s “The Trouble with Annie,” Wells’s 
response to Splitting Off assumes that feminism is currently so insti-
tutionalized within the university that to criticize it is now the more 
untraditional and liberating act. Similarly, Solway’s and Wells’s attacks 
on Carson and Zwicky suggest a disturbing correspondence between the 
viability of alternative modes of poetry, criticism, and scholarship, and 
the gender of their practitioners. For Solway, Carson is oxymoronically 
radical and modish; for Wells, Zwicky’s “impulse towards homogeneity, 
towards orthodoxy, towards the erasure of personality” (41) is peculiarly 
feminine. 
Running throughout both Solway’s attack on Carson and Wells’s 
attack on Zwicky is the discomfiting belief that those approaches to 
criticism, philosophy, poetry, and scholarship that I have here been call-
ing lyric are not only gendered female, but also represent the failure of 
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literary and academic cultures in Canada. Not only are such perspec-
tives narrowly conservative, they also betray deep-seated gender preju-
dices that are in and of themselves a hindrance to this, and any other, 
country’s artistic and intellectual future. Though Carson has called her-
self “a classical philologist, not . . . an ideologue of institutions” (“The 
Idea” 6), like Zwicky’s, her writings reflect a complex engagement with 
her multi-faceted role as a poet and a pedagogue, as well as with the 
analytical methods, hierarchical assumptions, and cultural stereotypes 
that have shaped her academic field. The individual choices that both 
Zwicky and Carson have made in allowing diverse genres of research 
and writing to influence and infiltrate their work represent these poet-
scholars’ shared ability to work beyond the restrictions of academic con-
vention, and, in doing so, to help bring the political assumptions and 
cultural ramifications of those conventions to light. 
Author’s Note
For those whose conversation and editorial insight helped shape this essay, I am sincerely 
grateful. To D.M.R. Bentley, Alison Conway, Manina Jones, Phil Glennie, and Ian Rae 
especially, many thanks.
Notes
1 The poet and scholar Tim Lilburn, whose name is among those most frequently 
associated with Zwicky’s in the realm of Canadian literary criticism, is among the few who 
have set Zwicky’s and Carson’s names together in print. “I am a poet and an essayist,” he 
writes in an essay published in The Fiddlehead in 2006: “I also have a scholarly interest in 
Plato. Perhaps it seems strange for a poet to have interests like this, but in this country it 
is not all that uncommon. I think of Jan Zwicky reading Wittgenstein, the pre-Socratics, 
and Plato; Erín Mouré, the French theorists and Augustine; Anne Carson, all the Greeks” 
(“Thinking” 156). 
2 The University Affairs issue mentioned above, and the essay collections Lyric Ecology: 
An Appreciation of the Work of Jan Zwicky (2010) and Thinking and Singing: Poetry and 
the Practice of Philosophy (2002), offer an accessible survey of the poets and scholars most 
intimately connected with, and/or influenced by Zwicky’s writings. Carson’s inf luence is 
less well documented, but a few salient examples may be noted. Anne Simpson employs 
Eros the Bittersweet in the rhetorical framework of the essay “Orpheus Recalling Eurydice”; 
and, in one of the poems that accompanies that piece in the essay collection A Ragged Pen: 
Essays on Poetry and Memory (2006), she seems to channel Eros the Bittersweet’s devotion to 
unconsummated desire, depicting Orpheus’ love for Eurydice as a tense relation between 
the pair’s real and imagined connections:
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Ever since he arrived, each day
lengthening gradually into dusk, he’s had trouble
sleeping. He misses her
more when he’s with her. (80)
Méira Cook and Steve McCaffery each cite from Eros the Bittersweet in their respect-
ive introductions to Writing Lovers: Reading Canadian Love Poetry by Women (2005) and 
Prior to Meaning: The Protosemantic and Poetics (2001); and, in “Six Short Talks: reading 
in, around, & on (& on) Anne Carson’s ‘Possessive Used as Drink (Me): a lecture in the 
form of fifteen minutes’,” Emily Carr mimics the form of Carson’s first book of poetry, 
Short Talks (1992), by structuring her paper as a series of short, semi-ekphrastic vignettes. 
Finally, in “Drawing Breath: Creative Elements and their Exile from Higher Education,” 
an article published in the pedagogic journal Arts and Humanities in Higher Education, the 
University of Glasgow professor Alison Phipps turns to Carson’s Decreation: Poetry, Essays, 
Opera (2005) in order to illuminate her advocacy of creative expression in the classroom.
3 Notably, Kirsch was among those who applauded Solway’s Books in Canada attack 
on Carson, commending him, in a letter to the editor published in a subsequent issue of 
the magazine, for exposing a writer whose “complexity” is “plagiarized from Stein, Celan, 
et al.” (“Letter” 40).
4 The use of L and R in my citations from Lyric Philosophy and Wisdom & Metaphor 
indicates the texts’ left- and right-hand pages.
5 Zwicky writes elsewhere that because nature poetry is defined by the acceptance of, 
and reverence for, a world that exists beyond the scope of human language, no nature poem 
is ever “more than a finger pointing at the moon: its words do not ‘contain’ reality, but 
merely tell us in what direction we should look” (“Lyric Realism” 88). Though I have been 
speaking of the discursive effect of terms such as lyric and domesticity in “Loure,” and thus 
referring to the ways in which the poem directs readers to the broader complex of Zwicky’s 
philosophy, in Zwicky’s view, a (nature) poem’s purpose is not simply to participate in lin-
guistic signification, but rather to act as “a kind of ontological signpost” (88), bringing to 
light its own inability to express that which lies beyond its linguistic purview.
6 Here, one ought to consider the implications of Solway’s sardonic worry, in the 
Director’s Cut version of “The Trouble with Annie,” that his essay “runs the risk of candour 
sounding like dyspepsia or defamation” (52-53). Although a number of Solway’s points 
about academic integrity deserve consideration, his decision to cultivate the celebrity of 
his own critical voice through polemical shock tactics and misogynistic spectacle serious-
ly undermined the validity of his critique. As with Brooks’s review of Tenured Radicals, 
those who discounted Solway’s Books in Canada essay were clearly influenced by its tenor 
(Jennings 39), thinking Solway to be “bombastic” and “grandiloquent” — “a contrarian 
whose own arguments turn against him” (Rae 47-48). Seemingly motivated by personal 
jealousy (Jennings 39), Solway’s cries of critical conspiracy appeared strenuously overblown 
at the time of the Books in Canada printing, making his accusations regarding Carson’s 
scholarship all too easy to dismiss. “I confess,” wrote Chris Jennings in a letter to the 
editor published in a subsequent issue of Books in Canada, “I have not read John Felstiner’s 
Paul Celan: Poet, Survivor, Jew, nor have I yet taken Solway’s suggestion that I compare 
Felstiner’s work to Carson’s, though I may” (39). In “The Trouble with Annie,” Solway 
argues that Carson’s Economy of the Unlost appropriates John Felstiner’s readings of Paul 
Celan, and obscures Carson’s reliance upon his work; he even provides page references to 
substantiate his point. In my opinion, the similarities between the passages he marks do 
not prove indefensible borrowing on Carson’s part; however, those similarities do exist, and 
Solway’s complaint in this respect is not unreasonable. 
It is of particular significance that Jennings countered Solway’s claims without inves-
tigating them fully. Whatever it was that Solway produced in “The Trouble with Annie” 
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— whether “dyspepsia,” “defamation,” or partially legitimate critique — both Jennings 
and Rae found his methods so absurd as to suspect his seriousness, and question whether 
or not the essay was part of a literary hoax like the prank Solway had pulled earlier by 
“translating” and publicizing the fictitious Greek poet Andreas Karavis. Ironically, the 
response engendered by Solway’s invective situated him implicitly on more stereotypically 
female shores. “Verbal continence is an essential feature of the masculine virtue of sophro-
syne (‘prudence, soundness of mind, moderation, temperance, self-control’),” writes Carson 
in “The Gender of Sound,” whereas “the women of classical literature are a species given 
to disorderly and uncontrolled outf low of sound — to shrieking, wailing, sobbing, shrill 
lament, loud laugher, screams of pain or pleasure and eruptions of raw emotion in general” 
(Glass 126). “When a man lets his current emotions come up to his mouth and out through 
his tongue,” she continues, “he is thereby feminized” (126). Because the academic ideal of 
reasoned argument is still today invested with the traditional Greek qualities of sophrosyne, a 
vitriolic essay such as “The Trouble with Annie” can, in this light, appear to be as perversely 
“feminine,” and as foreign, as the barbarisms that it claims Carson’s teaching represents. I 
note this not to condone Solway’s hostile approach, but rather to draw attention to the ways 
in which critical reactions to work such as his may themselves be subject to the historical 
assumptions that differentiate “male” temperance and “female” noise from each other.
7 In the spring of 2012, Zwicky republished “The Ethics of the Negative Review” 
online, in concert with the newly established feminist organization Canadian Women in 
the Literary Arts. From there, the essay met with another unsympathetic response by the 
critic Michael Lista, who responded polemically in an article published in the National Post. 
Whereas Wells’s criticism of “The Ethics of the Negative Review” implies that the supposed 
“femininity” of Zwicky’s philosophy renders her argument anti-intellectual, Lista’s implies 
that Zwicky’s call for active silence is, in fact, anti-feminist: “a miserable, low thing to tell 
another woman, another writer, another human” (“The good” n. pag.). This time, Zwicky 
responded to the criticism of her work, defending her position in a subsequent issue of the 
National Post (see “Good, bad” n. pag.). She also followed up, roughly one week later, with 
a renewed argument concerning the ethics of negative reviewing — one that deals explicitly 
with the online conversation that erupted in the midst of her written confrontation with 
Lista, and asks: “Do most girls favour gushy raves while most guys hanker for verbal brass 
knuckles?” The answer, she argues, is no (see “On critical culture” n. pag.).
Works Cited
Bartlett, Cheryl. “The gift of multiple perspectives in scholarship.” University Affairs. Web. 
6 Feb. 2012.
Berkowitz, Peggy. “A lyric approach: Integrative scholarship.” Editorial. University Affairs 
53.1 (Jan. 2012): 3. Print.
Brooks, Peter. “Western Civ at bay.” Rev. of Giants and Dwarfs: Essays 1960-1990, by Allan 
Bloom, and Tenured Radicals: How Politics Has Corrupted Our Higher Education, by 
Roger Kimball. TLS 25 Jan. 1991: 5-6. Microfilm. Research Publications: The Times 
Literary Supplement (1991): 91-08-09.
Campbell, Wanda. “Postmodern Ekphrasis in the Poetry of Anne Compton, Anne Carson, 
and Anne Simpson.” Canadian Poetry 65 (2009): 9-21. Print.
Carson, Anne. Eros the Bittersweet. 1986. Normal: Dalkey Archives P, 1998. Print.
—. “The Idea of a University (After John Henry Newman).” The ThreePenny Review 78 
(1999): 6-8. JSTOR. Web. 9 June 2011.
Jan Zwicky and Anne Carson 213
—. Glass, Irony & God. New York: New Directions, 1995. Print.
Foucault, Michel. Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews. Ed. 
Donald F. Bouchard. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1977. Print.
Furlani, André. “Jan Zwicky: Lyric Philosophy Lyric.” Canadian Literature 191 (2006): 
48-69. Print.
Godard, Barbara. “Critical Fictions: Phenomenology, Structuralism, Post-Structuralism, 
Feminism.” 100 Years of Critical Solitudes: Canadian and Québécois Criticism from the 
1880s to the 1980s. Ed. Caroline Bayard. Toronto: ECW, 1992. 248-83. Print.
—. “Structuralism/Post-Structuralism: Language, Reality and Canadian Literature.” Future 
Indicative: Literary Theory and Canadian Literature. Ed. John Moss. Ottawa: U of 
Ottawa P, 1987. 25-51. Print.
Kimball, Roger. Rev. of Arion: A Journal of Humanities and the Classics 3rd ser. 1.1. TLS 
8 Mar. 1991: 25. Microfilm. Research Publications: The Times Literary Supplement 
(1991): 91-08-09.
—. “Tenured Radicals.” Letter. TLS 8 Feb. 1991: 14. Microfilm. Research Publications: The 
Times Literary Supplement (1991): 91-08-09.
—. Tenured Radicals: How Politics Has Corrupted Our Higher Education. 1990. New York: 
Harper, 1991. Print.
Kirsch, Adam. “All Mere Complexities.” Rev. of Autobiography of Red: A Novel in Verse, by 
Anne Carson. The New Republic 18 May 1998: 37-41. Print. 
—. Letter. Books in Canada 30.3 (2001): 40. Print.
Kroetsch, Robert. The Lovely Treachery of Words: Essays Selected and New. Toronto: Oxford 
UP, 1989. Print.
Lahey, Anita. “Academic Papers Get Poetic.” University Affairs 53.1 (Jan. 2012): 25-29. 
Print.
Lilburn, Tim. “Thinking the Rule of Benedict Within Modernity.” The Fiddlehead 228 
(2006): 155-63. Print.
Lista, Michael. “The good in bad reviews.” National Post. Web. 29 July 2012.
McKay, Don. Birding, or Desire. Toronto: McClelland, 1983. Print.
—. Vis à Vis: Field Notes on Poetry and Wilderness. Kentville: Gaspereau, 2001. Print.
Murray, Heather. Working in English: History, Institution, Resources. Toronto: U of Toronto 
P, 1996. Print.
Murray, Stuart J. “The Autobiographical Self: Phenomenology and the Limits of Narrative 
Self-Possession in Anne Carson’s Autobiography of Red.” English Studies in Canada 
31.4 (2005): 101-22. Print.
Phipps, Alison. “Drawing Breath: Creative Elements and their Exile from Higher 
Education.” Arts and Humanities in Higher Education 9 (2010): 42-53. Web. 20 May 
2011.
Rae, Ian. “Anne Carson and the Solway Hoaxes.” Canadian Literature 176 (2003): 45-65. 
Print.
Simpson, Anne. “Orpheus Recalling Eurydice.” A Ragged Pen: Essays on Poetry & Memory. 
Ed. Robert Finley. Kentville: Gaspereau, 2006. 69-83. Print.
Solway, David. Director’s Cut. Erin: Porcupine’s Quill, 2003. Print.
—. “Standard Average Canadian, or The Influence of Al Purdy.” Canadian Notes & Queries 
59 (2001): 18-20. Print.
—. “The Trouble with Annie: David Solway Unmakes Anne Carson.” Books in Canada 30.1 
(Jul. 2001): 24-26. Print.
Verene, Donald Phillip. “Critical Discussion.” Rev. of Lyric Philosophy, by Jan Zwicky. 
Philosophy and Literature 18.1 (1994): 124-30. Print.
Wells, Zach. “Fitting In: The CanLit Poem.” Rev. of Splitting Off, by Triny Finlay. Books 
in Canada 33.8 (2004): 31-33. Print.
214 Scl/Élc
—. “Strawman Dialectics.” Rev. of The Malahat Review 144: Special Issue on Reviewing, 
ed. Marlene Cookshaw and Lorna Jackson. Books in Canada 33.1 (2004): 40-41. Print.
Zwicky, Jan. “The Ethics of the Negative Review.” The Malahat Review 144 (2003): 54-63. 
Print.
—. Forge. Kentville: Gaspereau, 2011. Print.
—. “Good, bad — and just plain ugly.” National Post. Web. 4 July 2012. 
—. Lyric Philosophy. Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1992. Print.
—. Lyric Philosophy. 2nd edn. Kentville: Gaspereau, 2012. Print.
—. “Lyric Realism: Nature Poetry, Silence, and Ontology.” The Malahat Review 165 (2008): 
85-91. Print.
—. “Once Upon a Time in the West: Heidegger and the Poets.” Thinking and Singing: 
Poetry and the  Practice of Philosophy. Ed. Tim Lilburn. Toronto: Cormorant, 2002. 
187-99. Print.
—. “On critical culture.” National Post. Web. 13 July 2012.
—. Wisdom & Metaphor. Kentville: Gaspereau, 2003. Print.
